Introduction
In Hungary in 1995 everything and everyone is in transition. The economy is on a bumpy path heading away from central command toward market forces. The government, controlled by democratically * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank the Gennan Marshall Fund of the United States for the fellowship that enabled this research to be undertaken and Brooklyn Law School for the grant that supported the transformation of the data collected into written form. The fieldwork was done during the 1994-95 academic year and this article depicts the evolving refugee situation in Hungary at that time.
Ethnic Hungarians who enter Hungary seeking refuge are channelled into the refugee system, while others who need refuge are channelled into the temporary protection system. Access to the refugee system is not the only area in which ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers receive an advantage. The less favourable camp conditions and the restrictions on freedom of movement appear to fall more heavily on those asylum seekers who are not ethnic Hungarians. The reality of refugee status in Hungary is that it is largely reserved for ethnic Hungarians.
On its face, the law does not limit the applicants for refugee status, and not all ethnic Hungarians who apply for refugee status receive it. Nonetheless, almost all successful candidates for refugee status are ethnic Hungarians. In contrast, the large numbers of asylum seekers fr9m other backgrounds are generally shunted into temporary protection status. There they receive food and shelter and other basic necessities, but they lack any substantial legal protection.
This two tier system has led to many who qualify under the Hungarian and the 1951 Convention never receiving refugee status and its attendant legal protection. Almost all of those who have not been recognized as refugees have lacked Hungarian ancestry. At the same time, a substantial number of those recognized in Hungary appear to be immigrants rather than refugees. Many describe leaving lives of hardship and diminished opportunities, to be sure. Personal interviews with many different individuals granted refugee status lead to the conclusion that the hardship frequently did not constitute persecution. Almost all in this category were ethnic Hungarians.
The result is that Hungary, which does not have a law allowing immigration based on ethnic heritage, has distorted its refugee system to accomplish an immigration goal. Moreover, in counting immigrants as refugees, Hungary has effectively inflated the size of its refugee population, thereby misleading donors and increasing the amount of contributions received from the international community for refugee assistance. Whether the international community would be equally generous in providing assistance to Hungary for the resettlement of ethnic Hungarian immigrants is doubtful.
Simultaneously, Hungary has created the functional equivalent of a Law of Return, allowing those who share the ethnic background of the citizens of Hungary to enter the society and become full members. Although there are relatively few nations with a Law of Return, notably Israel, Germany and Greece, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with Hungary's aims. What is objectionable is accomplishing this goal by misusing the refugee process, which has obvious negative consequences for the refugee programme itself. It also has negative consequences for international efforts to raise ever-dwindling funds to support everincreasing refugees. In addition, it has negative consequences for the rule of law in Hungary. A country newly freed from one party rule should develop the contours of an important social policy such as immigration in the legislative arena. Recent legislation concerning immigration does not provide a right to immigrate based on ancestry. This suggests that Parliament does not want to establish a Law of Return at this time, and the refugee system should not be manipulated to create one.
The historical legacy

From Sarajevo I to Sarajevo 11
The assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, the Archduke of the AustroHungarian Empire, in Sarajevo in 1914 ignited the conflagration of the First World War, the flames from which consumed the Hungarian part of the empire, as well as the larger Austrian portion. The ensuing peace treaties punished Hungary, one of the losers, by radically redrawing its boundaries. 4 Under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and its population. 5 Its territory shrank from 125,000 square miles to 36,000 square miles, while its population fell from 21 million to 7.5 million. 6 In 1920 this meant that large populations of Hungarians fell within the newly enlarged boundaries of the bordering States, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, a situation that continues to the present day. ' In the first few years after the borders were redrawn in 1920, there was significant migration into and out of Hungary. 8 Approximately 4 'The peacemakers of 1919 fulfilled ... the bargains made with Italy and Rumania in order to bring them into the war ... The Rumanians insisted on the historical unity of Transylvania and added claims to Hungarian territory on ethnic grounds ... ' AJ.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, (1948) , 272-3. It is difficult to comment on this issue without making a political statement about the legitimacy ofpolitical control in the region, and especially in Transylvania. The important point is that major changes in territory and population occurred. 5 JuditJuh5sz, International Migration in Hungary (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Vicki Goldberg, 'All-Conquering Hungarians, Empire or No', New ork Tows, 3 Dec. 1995 , H47. PMI PEter T6th, 'Refugees, Immigrants and New Citizens in Hungary, 1988 -1992 Hungay at a Crossroads, (1995), 69, 71 (hereafter Fullerton et al., Refugees and Mgrants) .
6 Ibid.
7 Hungarian citizens who fell outside the new smaller territory of Hungary could choose to maintain Hungarian citizenship by moving to the reconfigured Hungary or stay and take up the citizenship of the State now exercising authority over the land where they lived. T6th, above note 5, at 70. Many of the areas formerly part of the Kingdom of Hungary included large populations of non-Hungarians. For example, the majority of the population of Transylvania was Romanian even when Transylvania was formally part of the Kingdom of Hungary; in 1910 Hungarians made up 34% of the population, while Romanians comprised 55% and Germans 9%. Taylor, above note 4, 289. Nonetheless, there were many communities of Hungarians and Germans whose families had lived in Transylvania for centuries, while political power had been in the hands of the Hungarian population. Juhfsz, above note 5, at 5.
Towns near the western border with Austria lost more than 12 per cent of their population. 2 ' The brain drain that characterized this population movement was astounding. Ninety per cent of the refugees were under 40; 25 per cent were professionals; the majority of the manual workers were skilled employees. 25 In 1957 the borders were again sealed. Few Hungarians were allowed to leave legally, and those who left illegally faced criminal penalties and were stripped of their citizenship.
6
Official statistics on both legal and illegal departures were secret so the dimensions of the refugee flow in the following decades are unclear.
27
Recently revealed data suggest that over 50,000 people departed illegally in the 1960s and 1970s. 28 Many who fled to the West were automatically treated as political refugees, with only perfunctory investigation of their circumstances and claims.
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This changed in the 1980s. Hungarians continued to leave at the rate of roughly 5,000 per year, 3° but their reception as refugees in Western Europe and North America was less automatic, however, as the goulash communism of Hungary and its liberalized passport regulations did not conform to the standard profile of a persecuting regime."
Even as the numbers of Hungarians granted refugee status in other countries declined, there still were more refugees leaving Hungary than refugees entering Hungary. Between 1948 and 1988 very few people sought refuge in Hungary. The borders were closely guarded, and the admission of refugees was a political matter decided at the highest levels. 2 Approximately 3,000 Greek communists fleeing the aftermath of civil war in Greece were granted refuge in the 1940s. 3 
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Magellen Fullerton the strictly protected borders and travel restrictions in neighbouring countries prevented travel through Hungary. 3 "
Exodus from Transylvania
Hungary became a refugee receiving country again in the 1980s. Surprisingly, this occurred before the fall of the communist regime in 1989. The transformation, which began in earnest at the end of 1987, was a delayed consequence of the post-First World War border changes, aggravated by the post-Second World War communist regimes in the region. By the mid 1980s, roughly ten million Hungarians lived in Hungary, while five million or so live outside the borders. Three and a half million lived in neighbouring countries, often in close-knit communities. 3 '
The Trianon Treaty left close to two million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. 38 In the 1980s they found life there more and more desperate, as did many people in Romania, but the minority status of the ethnic Hungarians compounded the difficulties. 39 They often faced great discrimination, increased pressure against the use of the Hungarian language in the schools, and quotas that limited their children's chances for higher education.'
A large part of the ethnic Hungarian population in Romania lived in Transylvania, the region bordering Hungary. 4 Able to speak the language, often having relatives in Hungary, 42 many of them entered Hungary as visitors and simply stayed. Although their status was illegal,' they refused to return to Romania. By the end of 1988 there were more than 13,000 asylum seekers in Hungary, 95 per cent of whom were ethnic Hungarians 127 (1994) .
44 Sik et al., above note 42, at 28-9. Refugees could obtain a temporary residence card to legalize their stay in Hungary for a short term. Most received a permit for only one month, although gradually the authorities began issuing them for longer periods. from Romania.' 5 The Hungarian government called them 'aliens provisionally residing in Hungary' rather than refugees, but it refused to send them back.' The government even established a Settlement Fund to help accommodate the asylum seekers. 47 For the first time in Central Europe, a socialist country implicitly acknowledged persecution in sister socialist states and refused to force refugees to return." 8 The exodus from Romania continued and quickened in 1989. In that year alone more than 17,000 asylum seekers arrived in Hungary, most from Romania.
9 There were nearly 11,000 ethnic Hungarians, 5,500 ethnic Romanians, and almost 1,000 ethnic Germans. 0 The numbers increased again in 1990. This was a surprise. Many had predicted that the overthrow of Ceausescu in December 1989 would slow the exodus. Instead the reverse happened. There was fighting between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Tirgu Mures, Romania in the spring of 1990. Three people died and hundreds were injured. 5 " There was more violence in Bucharest in the summer. 52 This heightened the fear in the ethnic Hungarian communities; over 18,000 asylum seekers came to Hungary in 1990, more than 17,000 of them from Romania. Nearly 15,000 were ethnic Hungarians; 2,400 were ethnic Romanians; and 100 were ethnic Germans. 3 Asylum seekers continued to arrive in 1991, but the rate of arrivals slowed considerably. During the first six months approximately 3,000 asylum seekers entered, mostly ethnic Hungarians from Romania. 5 " Despite the decreasing numbers, the overall impact was substantial. In less than four years a country that had received a minuscule number of refugees during the preceding 40 years suddenly was sheltering 52,000. Of these 50,000 were from Romania, including 40,000 ethnic Hungarians. 55 4s Nagy, above note 29, at 52. See also 
Sarajevo II
Then the dam burst. War broke out on Hungary's southern border between Croatia and Serbia in the summer of 1991 and the number of asylum seekers sky-rocketed. 6 Hungarian border guards faced desperate groups of civilians fleeing the fighting. Most were from the Baranyi triangle, 7 an area of Croatia near Vukovar. Shell-shocked and disoriented, many had left their homes on only several hours notice. 58 In the last half of 1991, more than 52,000 people -more than the entire existing refugee population -sought refuge in Hungary. 9 Thus, within six months the refugee population doubled. In addition, many more refugees may have entered and never registered with the authorities." Most of the asylum seekers that arrived in 1991 were ethnic Croats. 6 In 1992 the war zone in former Yugoslavia shifted. Serbian forces attacked Bosnia and Herzegovina in April. 62 More refugees, this time mostly Bosnians, 63 streamed into Hungary. Again, many fled in the most desperate and disorienting circumstances with only a few hours notice. By the end of 1992 over 16,000 new asylum seekers have arrived, more than 15,000 of them from ex-Yugoslavia, 4 with the majority Bosnians, but one-third ethnic Hungarians. 65 The flow of the dispossessed slowed in 1993 and 1994. Approximately 5,000 asylum seekers arrived in 1993 and 3,000 in 1994.66 As if a pendulum had swung, the refugee flows again altered. Although people still arrived from former Yugoslavia, the majority of asylum seekers now 66 Menekal6k Magyarorszkgon (1988 = Refugees in Hungary (1988 Hungary ( -1995 , prepared by Menekttiwgyi Es Migraci6s Hivatal Informatikai Oszt&Iy = Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Information Department, Jan. 1996 (hereafter ORMA Statistics, 1988 .
were ethnic Hungarians, with significant numbers from the Vojvodina region of Serbia."
The lull of 1993 and 1994 continued through the first half of 1995, although everyone worried that major fighting in ex-Yugoslavia would begin again and trigger further flight. Nonetheless, the number of individuals who lived as refugees in Hungary dwindled to a startling degree. By the end of 1994 there were only 1,693 individuals in refugee camps; in addition, the government provided financial subsidies to 6,045 refugees living in private accommodation. 68 Although the Serb offensives in July 1995 that overran 'safe areas' in Srebrenica and Zepa created major new refugee movements, 69 few of those refugees reached Hungary. 70 In the seven years from 1988 to 1995, Hungary received 133,000 refugees. Of these, 76,000 were from ex-Yugoslavia and 54,000 from Romania. 71 Only 7,700 of those from ex-Yugoslavia remained registered in 1995 as refugees receiving temporary protection in Hungary. 72 Only 4,000 others, mostly ethnic Hungarians from Romania, received official refugee status. 7 3 Roughly 120,000 are no longer visible, but no one knows where they have gone. Many have probably left Hungary; many others have probably stayed but in a non-refugee status. Much appears to depend on the country of origin and the ethnic background of the refugees.
Of those who fled ex-Yugoslavia, approximately 68,000 are no longer visibly present. The consensus is that most Croats have returned, if not to their homes, then to other areas not occupied by the Serbs. 74 As the Croats comprised the overwhelming majority of refugees from exYugoslavia, 5 decrees build on this international agreement, but most of the actual practice stems from unwritten administrative policies that have developed to fill yawning gaps in the legal structure.
International law
In early 1989, Hungary, still ruled by a communist government, became a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,' the first East bloc country to do so." It also ratified the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention. 86 Although its accession to the Refugee Convention signalled that Hungary was willing to accept the international definition of refugee, it also erected a major barrier. Hungary conditioned its ratification on an alternative narrow definition of those who qualify as refugees, recognizing only those who fear persecution in Europe.
87 Known as the geographic reservation, this provision allows Hungary to limit its obligations under the Convention to a small (and totally European) subset of all the refugees in the world. This geographic reservation is currently maintained by only four other countries -Malta, Monaco, Madagascar, and Turkey -out of the 132 States party to the Convention and/or the Protocol.
88
Hungary bases its insistence on the geographic reservation on its fear of being overwhelmed with refugees. Large numbers of potential refugees obviously pose legitimate and serious concerns for a country. Nevertheless, Magyellen Fullerton there are questions as to whether Hungary's fear on this score is wellfounded." No other Central European country which has ratified the Convention has adopted the geographic reservation, and none has been overrun with refugees, as experience in Poland and the Czech Republic can show. 90 Some have argued that Hungary is in a more vulnerable geographic position in terms of refugee flows. It is certainly nearer the Balkans than Poland or the Czech Republic, and it has indeed received many thousands more people fleeing the war in the Balkans. However, Hungary has not afforded refugee status to most of these people, viewing them instead as war victims. They are assisted by the government, but not given the legal protection or status received by those recognized as refugees under the Convention. 91 Moreover, as the Balkans are part of Europe, those fleeing persecution there are not excluded from receiving protection in Hungary. Rather, the geographic reservation precludes those fleeing persecution in Africa and Asia from finding refuge in Hungary.
Others have asserted that Hungary needs to invoke the geographic reservation because it is likely to be a magnet for asylum seekers from other continents. As one of the Visegrid countries, Hungary has a more advanced economy than many Central European States. The debates are endless as to whether the economy is more robust in Hungary or the Czech Republic or Poland. The answer, if there is one, is irrelevant. What is relevant is the general perception that the economies in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are all becoming stronger. Moreover, they are all significantly ahead of the conditions in many of the countries that 89 Pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Hungary and UNHCR, promulgated as 23/1990. (11.7.) MT rendelet [Cabinet Decree 23, 7 Feb. 1990 ], Magyar K6zlbny [Official Gazette] 1990 , No. 11, at 172, the UNHCR office interviews asylum seekers from countries outside Europe. Very few have been found to have a well-founded fear. The Hungarian authorities have granted short-term residency permits, but not work permits, to the few recognized by UNHCR and their situation is tenuous: Nagy, above note 21, at 37-8. Surprisingly, between 1990 and 1995, only 136 non-Europeans were recognized as in need of protection in Hungary, of these, only 70 remain. During that period, a total of 1,885 non-European asylum seekers applied in Hungary: Interview, Agnes Ambrus, UNHCR Legal Protection Officer, Budapest, 1 Aug. 1995.
9 Cf. the experience of the Czech Republic and Poland, neither of-which maintains the geographic reservation. The Czech Refugee Department of the Ministry of the Interior reported 8,578 asylum applications between 1990 and early 1995; of these, 4,365 were rejected, 2,535 did not complete the proceedings, and refugee status was granted to 1,321 individuals. Would supporters of the Bricker Amendment in the US Senate from 1948 to 1953 be surprised to find a communist government relying on a treaty to circumvent the need for domestic legislation? Senator Bricker and others strenuously opposed the internal application within the US of international treaties on human rights. See, for example, Covey T. Oliver et al., 7e Intenational Legal System: Cases and Materi4l, 1059 (4th ed., 1995) . government decrees regulating different aspects of the asylum process. In addition, the new legislation concerning citizenship has a significant impact on those seeking permanent refuge in Hungary.
The Constitution
The 1949 Constitution of Hungary, enacted by the postwar communist government, contained an asylum provision:
Everyone who is persecuted for his democratic behaviour, or for his activity to enhance social progress, the liberation of peoples or the protection of peace, may be granted asylum.'
This constitutional protection was exercised solely according to the whim of the government. There was no legally enforceable right and no judicial remedy.
95
In October 1989 the 1949 Constitution underwent a major revision.
96
The earlier asylum provision was repealed and replaced by a new guarantee:
(1) The Republic of Hungary -in accordance with the provisions of lawgrants asylum for those foreign nationals, who in their country of nationality, or for those stateless persons who in their residence, were persecuted for racial, religious, national, linguistic or political reasons. In the new Constitution, asylum is a right, rather than a matter of political discretion. Those entitled to asylum are described more specifically than in the earlier Constitution, and the description is generally in accord with the internationally accepted refugee definition. Further, the Constitution prevents easy amendment of laws concerning asylum. A super majority of Parliament must agree before legislation on asylum can be enacted. 9 Art. 65(3), Hungarian Constitution (1989). Contrary to first impression, this requirement does not explain the lack of asylum legislation. The coalition governing since the spring of 1994 controls more than two-thirds of the Parliament, yet there is still no asylum law. addition, once an individual is granted asylum, he or she cannot be extradited. This bar to extradition allows no exceptions.
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The definition of those constitutionally entitled to asylum in Hungary echoes the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention, but with several crucial differences. ' The most noticeable is that the Hungarian Constitution contains no geographical limitation on those entitled to asylum. This contradiction exists openly, but has not been addressed by any of the institutions dealing with refugees in Hungary.'°' A quite astounding anomaly results. The constitutional guarantee of asylum for refugees fleeing persecution anywhere in the world is ignored, while the geographical reservation to the 1951 Convention is followed.
In addition, the Hungarian Constitution protects those whose persecution is due to one of five factors: racial, religious, nationality, language, or political reasons. The 1951 Convention again is similar, but not coextensive in scope. 1 Indeed, the decree implementing the Convention is applied by the government, and the constitutional definition is ignored: Nagy, above note 29, at 53-4.
1o2 The political element is phrased differently. The 1951 Convention refers to persecution for reasons of political opinion, whereas the Hungarian Constitution refers to persecution for political reasons: art. 65(1). It is hard to predict whether these different formulations may have a substantial impact in practice. Hungarian officials and courts may conclude they are synonymous, or they might adopt the approach of the United States Supreme Court, which expressly refused to consider the political reasons or motives behind the persecutor's act, and instead focused exclusively on whether the persecution was triggered by the persecutor's view of the victim's political opinion; see IN'S a EHas-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
103 Art. 65(1), Hungarian Constitution (1989).
the governments over restrictions on the use of the Hungarian language in schools and elsewhere.' 0 5
In this context, it is not surprising that protection against persecution for linguistic reasons has attained constitutional status in Hungary. Although tensions over language and culture are not restricted to regions inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, Hungarian communities abroad have often been negatively affected. Consequently this constitutional provision means that ethnic Hungarians have a significantly greater chance of receiving asylum in Hungary. The Constitution does not limit asylum claims based on linguistic grounds to persecution against ethnic Hungarians. German speakers in Slovakia or Armenian speakers in Azerbaijan can also in theory seek protection under this provision of the Constitution.
6 As a matter of fact, however, it is Hungarian speakers who seek asylum in Hungary based on hostility triggered by the language they speak.
Legislation
In 1993 Parliament enacted new legislation regulating citizenship.'°7 Strictly speaking, this law does not concern refugee protection, but it interacts with the refugee system in a significant way. In general, an applicant seeking naturalization must satisfy five requirements, namely, eight years of continuous residence in Hungary; 1°8 no criminal record;'°9 the ability to support oneseli 1 1 basic knowledge of the Hungarian Constitution"' and a showing that naturalization would not be against the national interest." 2 In fact, there are six requirements, for the examination on the Hungarian Constitution is administered in Hungarian, thus adding a language requirement. As Hungarian is both unique and unusually 105 Michael J. Jordan, 'Slovalda, Hungary Ink Treaty', Budapest Sun, 23-29 Mar. 1995 , at 1.
Indeed, current language disputes have triggered great tension. In late 1995 Slovakia enacted legislation requiring all official documents and discussion in government offices and in all institutions, including schools, churches, and private associations, to be written and conducted in Slovakian. Kornel Dura, 'Slovak Language Law Draws Rebuke From Hungary', Budapest Sun, 30 Nov.-6 Dec. 1995, at 1. This law was greeted with outrage by the large ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia (600,000 out of 5.3 million): 'Instability in Slovalia Prompts Western Concern', and resulted in the Hunarian government recalling its ambassador to Slovakia Budapest Sun, 2-8 Nov. 1995, at 5.
As explained above, note 101, the 1951 Convention definition rather than the Constitution definition is the one the refugee officers in Hungary follow. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Constitution's focus on persecution based on language is relevant in setting the context of the refugee process in Hungay 1''01993. Evi LV. t6rv~ny a magyar illampolgfirsgr61 = Act No. LV of 1993 concerning Hungaran Citizenship (hereafter Citizenship Act).
I The residence period must precede the application date: Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(a). 109 The applicant must have no criminal record and no pending criminal proceedings: Citizenship Act, para. 4(l) (b) .
no Subsistence and residence in Hungary must be ensured: Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(c). "' Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(e). 1 Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(d).
difficult, the language criterion will serve as a much more serious obstacle to obtaining citizenship than will the constitutional knowledge prerequisite. The law relaxes the citizenship requirements for certain applicants. Specifically, the legislation reduces the continuous residence requirement from eight to three years for several categories of applicants for naturalization:.. those married to Hungarian citizens;14 those whose minor child is a Hungarian citizen;"' those adopted by a Hungarian citizen; 6 or those recognized by Hungarian authorities as refugees."
7
The law reduces the continuous residence requirement even further, to one year, for one category: ethnic Hungarians." 8 The preferential treatment offered by the citizenship law mirrors some of the distinctions that can be perceived in the constitutional law on asylum. Both the asylum provision in the Constitution and the naturalization law are written in neutral language; they protect all those recognized as refugees, whether ethnic Hungarian or not. Indeed, the citizenship law clearly treats refugees better than most other non-citizens of Hungary. Refugees receive a substantial advantage because they need only satisfy a three-year residency requirement," 9 a substantial advantage over the eight-year requirement imposed on most citizenship applicants.
Nevertheless, ethnic Hungarians are even better off than refugees, for they need only satisfy a one-year residency requirement, in addition they benefit from other advantages. For example, they are almost sure to be able to pass an examination in Hungarian, a language spoken by fewer than 15 million people which poses major barriers to the rest of the people in the world. They also are more likely to be acquainted with the structure of the Hungarian government and other basic constitutional knowledge.
Furthermore, under Hungarian law the decision to grant naturalization 11 Certain naturalization applicants need only satisfy a three-year continuous residence requirement plus fulfil the other four requirements listed above: Citizenship Act, para. 4(2). 14 This is restricted to those who have lived with a Hungarian citizen for three years or more in a valid marriage. The time can be shortened if the spouse died: Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(a). "1 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(b). 116 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(c). "17 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(d). 18 A non-Hungarian citizen who asserts that he or she is an ethnic Hungarian and has an ancestor who was a Hungarian citizen may apply after one year in Hungary so long as the other standard citizenship requirements are satisfied. Citizenship Act, para. 4(3). This does not extend to all former citizens/subjects of Hungary, which included many ethnic Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Germans, among others. Indeed, ethnic Hungarians only comprised 50-55% of the population of Hungary in 1910: Taylor, above note 4, at 290.
11 Although other barriers might prevent refugees from obtaining Hungarian citizenship, such as the Hungarian language test on constitutional knowledge or the 'against the national interest' requirement, few citizenship laws are more generous for refugees than Hungary's. In the United States, refugees and other permanent resident aliens face a five-year residency requirement: 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1). In Germany, the residency requirement is 10 years, shortened to 7 years for those granted official refugee status. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Asyur in Europe, vol. 2, 194 (4th ed., 1994) . is totally discretionary.' 20 Negative decisions are not accompanied by explanations and cannot be appealed.' 2 ' Although there are no reliable statistics concerning naturalization decisions, it would not be surprising if the decision-makers,"' consciously or subconsciously, considered Hungarian heritage a positive factor. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most of those granted citizenship in the past few years have been ethnic Hungarians.
Thus, the citizenship law on its face favours ethmic Hungarians over refugees and any other applicants. Moreover, other provisions of the citizenship law that at first glance appear neutral, in fact favour ethnic Hungarians. Lastly, it appears that the discretionary naturalization decisions may in practice favour applicants of Hungarian origin. 101) . As Hungary follows a dualist, rather than monist, legal tradition, its accession to the Convention and Protocol bound Hungary on the international plane only. Domestic implementation of the law needed further government action, which occurred with Decree 101: Nagy, above note 29, at 52. 124 It begins with provisions addressed to asylum seekers crossing the Hungarian border: 'This decree shall apply to the non-Hungarian nationals who, having crossed the frontier of the Hungarian People's Republic, apply for recognition as refugees' (section 1), and ends with provisions allowing judicial review of the denial of refugee status (section 19). The concluding provisions address the three-month deadline on seeking extensions of time (section 20); non-Hungarian nationals present in Hungary at the time the decree came into force, as well as those who later might be lawfully present in Hungary on non-refugee grounds and subsequently seek to apply for refugee status (section 21); and the effective date of the decree, 15 Oct. 1989 (section 22).
Decree
Application deadlines. Decree 101 sets forth a short period of time (72 hours after crossing the border into Hungary) in which refugee applicants must notify the police or border guards that they are seeking refugee status.' 25 Once this notice is given, there is a second period of 72 hours, within which applicants must submit formal applications for recognition as a refugee.' 26 On their face these provisions are neutral, but in practice they provide a significant advantage to ethnic Hungarians. The 72-hour deadlines are short. Those who do not speak the language are likely to have a much harder time ascertaining that there is a deadline and complying with it. Furthermore, many ethnic Hungarians have relatives or friends in Hungary, who can learn how the refugee system works and can assist the newcomers in manoeuvring their way through.' 2 7
Once a refugee application is filed, it triggers another set of deadlines. 125 Decree 101, section 3. 126 Technically, this second 72-hour period begins to run from the time of arriving at a refugee camp or at one of the three mentioned police stations: the Central Police Station in Budapest, the County of Csongrid, or the County of Szabolcs-Szatnfir. The application shall be filed on a government form, a copy of which is attached as an Appendix to the Decree: Decree 101, section 4(1)27 Candidates for refugee status spend the time between their arrival at the refugee camp and the hearing on their refugee application in a separate, closed section of the camp, Decree 101, section 7(1). During this quarantine period, which typically lasts one week (Interview, B6la Sz&kely, Director, B&6scsaba Refugee Camp, 6 Jun. 1995), medical screening and tests are done on each candidate: section 8(2)(b). While in the refugee camp the applicants surrender their passports or identity documents to the camp authorities: section 8(2)(c). In return they receive identity documents that entitle them to remain in Hungary during the process, to stay in the camp and use its services free of charge, and to receive free medical care: section 9.
128 The eligibility officers have 30 days from the date the application was submitted in which to make decisions on the applications, which may be extended once by 60 days: section 10(l),(2). Section 11(1) allows further gathering of evidence in special cases where the available information is insufficient and the current information indicates that it is possible the applicant should be recognized as a refugee. At present, the eligibility officers have been able to meet the deadlines in most cases: Interview, Istvhn Dob6, Chief As discussed earlier, Hungary adopted the 1951 Convention refugee definition subject to a major restriction: only those whose fear of persecution stems from events occurring in Europe are included.' 34 Thus, as a matter of treaty law, and of national law implementing the treaty, Hungary will, in practice, only afford refugee status to Europeans. Acknowledging that the geographic reservation allows Hungary to accept only European refugees does not automatically lead to the conclusion that Hungary accepts only ethnic Hungarian refugees. Indeed, the statistics indicate that this is not so. Many non-ethnic Hungarians have been granted protection in Hungary. Of the 133,000 asylum seekers accepted from 1988 through 1995, more than half were not of Hungarian background.' 36 Yet, the same statistics indicate that the Hungarian refugee procedure 131 Those individuals whose applications arejudged favourably are granted identity cards containing proof of residence in Hungary and a notation that they enjoy refugee status: section 16(2),(3). If they are living in a refugee camp they may continue to stay there, receiving room and board and other assistance provided by the government. Staffmembers in the camps attempt to identify employment opportunities. Skilled workers, such as electricians, often find work quickly. Others have much more difficulty. Interviews with Robert Ront6, Staff, Bicske Refugee Camp, 11 Feb., 4 Mar., 2 Apr. 1995. Those whose applications for refugee status are denied have five days in which to file an appeal: Decree 101, section 18(1); the first level of review is administrative: section 18(2), the second is to the courts: section 19(1).
132 'A person who is qualified as a refugee according to article 1, item C, as well as item B, para. (1), sub-clause a. of the Convention .. .': Decree 101, section 2 (1). In addition, section 1 specifies that the decree applies only to non-Hungarian nationals who have crossed the borders into Hungary.
133 Persons with a well-founded fear must be outside their country of nationality or, if they lack a nationality, the country where they formerly resided. Art. 1A(2), 1951 Convention.
134 Decree 101, section 2 expressly incorporates art. 1B(l)(a) of the 1951 Convention, which provides for the geographic reservation; see above, note 87. As noted above, the 1967 Protocol removed the 1 Jan. 1951 deadline, a point acknowledged in Decree 101, section 2(1). Thus, Decree 101 has a geographic restriction, but not a time restriction.
135 How treaty law and national decrees implementing treaty law can trump the constitution, which contains no such geographical restriction, is difficult to comprehend. Nonetheless, as to the geographical scope of persecution, the Hungarian government follows Decree 101, thereby restricting refugee status to those fleeing persecution in Europe, and eschews the unlimited geographical approach of the Constitution: Nagy, above note 29, at 53-4. Furthermore, Decree 101 places limitations even on those who fear the 'right kind' of persecution on the 'right' continent. Those whose stay in Hungary interferes with the security of the state, public order, or public health are not entitled to refugee status even if they face the type of persecution defined in the 1951 Convention: Decree 101, section 2(b). Needless to say, the 'security of the state', 'public order', and 'public health' are not defined. In addition, Decree 101 tracks the 1951 Convention and excludes from refugee status those who have committed a serious non-political crime outside Hungary prior to entering Hungary, or have committed war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes against humanity:, section 2(ak See ORMA Statistics 1988-1995, above note 66; of 133,120 asylum seekers from 1988-1995, 75,531 came from former Yugoslavia, most being Croats and Bosnians. exercises a powerful bias in favour of ethnic Hungarians. The data reveal that very few of the asylum seekers actually file applications and seek recognition as refugees. Approximately 5,000 of the 133,000 have filed refugee claims and followed the recognition process through to the end. Roughly 4,000 have been recognized as refugees under Decree 101.137 They are deemed 'Convention refugees' and receive the rights and benefits mandated by the 1951 Convention. This group also is eligible for any rights and benefits, such as a shorter residency requirement under the citizenship legislation law, that Hungarian law accords refugees.
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Most of the Convention refugees, perhaps 3,500 out of 4,000, are ethnic Hungarians.
Most of these seeking refuge in Hungary, including the overwhelming majority of the non-Hungarians, never take part in the official refugee procedure. Instead, they are shunted into a separate category. They are deemed temporarily protected persons and their cases are not reviewed to determine whether they satisfy the refugee definition set forth in Decree 101.139 Thus, they never have the opportunity to qualify for refugee status in Hungary.
The legal status of refugees. The legal status of those the Hungarian authorities recognize as refugees is set forth in a second decree, also dating from 1989.'" The terms of Law-Decree 19 are quite generous. 4 It provides that recognized refugees have all the rights of Hungarian citizens' 42 with three exceptions: refugees do not have the right to vote; may not be 137 Ibid. This constitutes 3.17% of the total number of registered asylum seekers. 1-See text accompanying notes 140-6, below. 139 There have been 73,888 temporarily protected persons in Hungary, 55.5% of the total of registered asylum seekers: ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66, at 1. 40 1989. 6vi 19. tbrv6nyerejfi rendelet a menektfltk~nt elismert szem6lyek jogf.ldsfr6l = LawDecree No. 19 of 1989 on the legal status of persons recognized as refugees (hereafter Law-Decree 19). The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic designated certain pronouncements as a Law-Decree (t6rv6nyerejfi rendelet) in order to indicate that they were more weighty than a decree (rendelet). The Law-Decree was issued by the government alone, however, and not enacted by a legislature.
141 The reality of refugee status in Hungary appears to be the same as the law. Those recognized as refugees experience no legal barriers to work. Anecdotal evidence indicates that they also experience little, if any, social discrimination in employment: Author's interviews with refugees in Hungary in winter and spring 1995. Because most recognized refugees in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians, they do not face the language barriers that are obstacles for refugees in many societies. Moreover, they are often perceived as fellow countrymen and women who have returned home after suffering persecution for loyally preserving Hungarian culture. Although the receptivity to ethnic Hungarian refugees may be diminishing somewhat (see Gy6rgy Csepeli and Endre Sik, 'Changing Content of Political Xenophobia in Hungary -Is the Growth of Xenophobia Inevitable?' in Fullerton et al. Rfigees and Mgrant, 121, 122-5), the past decade has been marked by an extraordinary sympathy to ethnic Hungarian communities in surrounding countries, making Hungary's refugee experience unique.
142 Law-Decree 19, section 1. 143 Ibid., section l(a). The legal barrier against voting can be overcome, of course, once the refugee becomes naturalized.
employed in jobs restricted to Hungarian citizens; and do not have to perform military service. In addition, refugees can receive Hungarian language classes free of charge. 4 Most important, receiving refugee status helps those who later seek to become naturalized citizens of Hungary. As described above, refugee status accelerates eligibility for Hungarian citizenship. 45 An eight-year residency requirement is reduced to three years. Moreover, Law-Decree 19 states that recognition as a refugee shall be considered an extraordinary circumstance in an application for naturalization." 4 Ethnic Hungarians, who constitute the vast majority of those recognized as refugees, can rely on an even greater acceleration: they are eligible for naturalization in one year. As their knowledge of Hungarian and their familiarity with Hungarian law is likely to be greater than that of others recognized as refugees, their success in obtaining citizenship is also likely to be vastly greater. Indeed, the preference written into the citizenship law and the preference that appears to exist in the refugee status procedure combine to enable a sizeable number of ethnic Hungarians to change their status from ethnic minority in a neighbouring country to a full member of Hungarian society. 147 In contrast, those categorized as temporarily protected are put into the second tier of a two tier system. If they pass a perfunctory screening that attempts to ascertain their country of origin and their membership in a group at risk, they are allowed to stay in Hungary." 4 The government attempts to assign them to refugee camps or to provide a rent subsidy that allows them to live in private housing. As temporarily protected persons, rather than refugees, they have no rights under Hungarian law. The law does not recognize their existence. This silence works against them; they are not allowed to work, and they are sometimes even denied permission to leave the refugee camp. 14 9
Refugee camps. A third decree grants the Minister of Interior the power to establish refugee camps or other refugee shelters.' 0 Also issued in 1989,51 Decree 64 provides broad guidelines for cooperation with other units of the national government, with local governments, and with nongovernmental organizations. 5 2 The refugee camps, in turn, are to provide food and shelter,' 5 3 assistance with integration into the community,' 4 and support for obtaining employment and other beneficial activity. 5 The reality is that there have been a variety of different refugee camps and shelters in Hungary." 6 Their conditions vary, as do their size.' 57 Moreover, the majority of people seeking refuge and protection have not been housed in government-run camps and shelters.' 58 Some have stayed at shelters run by non-government groups such as the Red Cross.' 59 Many have been taken in by relatives. Many others have used their savings, money sent from relatives abroad, and earnings from work in the underground economy, to rent private accommodation. 6 Those who live in camps must contend with difficult circumstances. Institutional living always poses problems, and these appear to be exacerbated in Hungary by unequal treatment. Although there are exceptions, the shelters largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarian refugees in 1995 appeared significantly more desirable than those largely inhabited by Bosnians and other non-Hungarians. A prime example can be found in comparing the refugee camp at Bicske with that at NagyatAd.
The camp at Bicske historically has housed many ethnic Hungarian residents; NagyatAd houses mostly Bosnian residents.' 6 ' The first noticeable difference is sheer size. The full capacity at Bicske is approximately 1-' Ibid., section l(l)(b). 1ss Ibid., section l(l)(c). It is striking that it explicitly authorizes support for refugees who intend to leave Hungary for a third country.
l-6 ORMA has established permanent refugee centres at Bicske, Bdk~scsaba, and Hadszoboszl6 and temporary shelters at Nagyat~d, Vase, Mohics, P~cs, Sikl6s, ZAnka, and Csongr-d. In 1995 ORMA opened a new centre at Debrecen, but by that time the camps at Hajdszoboszl6, Csongrad, Mohfcs, PNcs, Sikl6s, and Zdnka had been dosed: Interview, Agnes Ambrns, above note 129.
157 The camp population in Jan. 1996 was as follows: B&kdscsaba, 200; Bicske, 204; Nagyat~d, 1,590; Debrecen, 621; Wse, 150: Pal Nagy, ORMA Statistics, 19 Feb. 1996. 158 InJan. 1996 there were 7,158 registered asylum seekers; only 2,765 were housed in camps: ibid.
159 The Red Cross and similar groups have received financial support from the government to cover some of the costs of providing shelter-Interview, AgnesJantsits, Chief, International Division, Hungarian Red Cross, 30 Mar. 1995. On the early role of the Hungarian Red Cross in assisting refugees, see generally Sik & T6th, above note 43, at 65-72.
160 The government provides subsidies to assist with rent and utilities charges to those registered refugees living in private dwellings in Hungary. Ella Veres, 'Camps Soak Up Funds', Budapest Sun, 10-16 Nov. 1994 In contrast, the buildings at Nagyat~d betray their origins as a military post. 167 The buildings are large with multiple stories. 168 The rooms, formerly used as a barracks, are also large. Consequently, several families, separated by draped sheets, share one room.' 69 Frequently, families decorate their portion of the space with rugs and blankets they have knit while in the camp, but the architecture impedes the attempts to personalize family space. 7° Furthermore, the sheets that separate family areas provide no soundproofing, so a family cannot gain privacy by retreating to its own comer of the room.' 7 A third major difference between the two camps is in the freedom to leave. The residents of the Bicske refugee camp face no restrictions on leaving and returning, "' but in Nagyatdd the camp administration permits only a certain number of residents to leave each day. 173 The stated reason is that the large refugee population of 2,000 to 3,000 would cause 'serious problems' in a small town of 12,000 or so. 74 The policy of limiting the number of refugees who could go outside the camp each day continued, however, even when the camp population fell to fewer than 600.75 This policy, initiated by the camp director in response to a request of the local municipal authorities, 176 has many unfortunate consequences. The lack of freedom has created a certain prison-like atmosphere, even though that may not have been intended. It has given rise to a black market in passes,' and has resulted in palpable discrimination based on sex. Even though the passes are not officially restricted to men, in practice most are used by men. The women generally stay to take care of the children whose schooling finishes early in the day.' 78 Since it is perceived that the women cannot make full use of the few passes that are available, they rarely receive them.' 79 Although it is clearly more desirable to live in a refugee camp with no restrictions on leaving and entering, the point here is not to criticize the reasons articulated for the restrictive policy at the NagyatAd refugee shelter. Rather the point is that the camp that is much less hospitable, owing to its size, the concomitant lack of privacy, and the restricted freedom of movement, by and large does not house ethnic Hungarians. In contrast, the smaller, more congenial camp in Bicske has historically housed ethnic Hungarian refugees. In this respect, the preference for ethnic Hungarian refugees detected in the legal provisions is also reflected in the daily life of refugees.
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Discriminatogy treatment. An outside observer will note a marked difference in the treatment of refugees in Hungary, and ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers appear to benefit on every measure. This can doubtless be explained in part by non-discriminatory factors, such as the timing and sequence of the refugee movements. Perhaps the refugees who arrived in Hungary first, in the late 1980s, tended to be sheltered in small refugee camps. Those who arrived later, in 1991 and 1992, came in large numbers and tended to be accommodated in large camps opened in response to needs. 8 ' As the first wave of refugees was primarily ethnic Hungarian, and the second was not, this might explain the difference in the character of the camps. However, this is no more than a partial explanation. The 175 In mid-1995 human rights groups in Hungary organized a joint mission to evaluate and monitor conditions at the Nagyat~d Refugee Camp. The camp director indicated that restrictions on leaving the camp would be removed. camp populations have not been static and although there has been a substantial turnover,"' the difference in the characteristics of the camp population has remained. One of the starkest differences in treatment involves the distinction between those accorded refugee status and those accorded temporary protection. More than 90 per cent of those deemed refugees, and thus entitled to virtually the same rights as citizens, are ethnic Hungarians. 1 83 More than 90 per cent of those deemed temporarily protected persons, who are assisted with food and shelter but denied many other rights, including the right to work legally, are not ethnic Hungarians. 1 On their face the statistics are damning, but the factors that have contributed to channelling asylum seekers into these categories must be examined to see if there are non-discriminatory explanations for the situation.
For example, the circumstances that compelled people to flee might account for the difference in treatment. Perhaps more of the asylum seekers who fled Romania left traditional political persecution: A totalitarian state that tolerated no dissidence and viewed with hostility any cohesive group that did not exist to further government aims.' 85 In Ceausescu's Romania, the Hungarian minority, an ethnic group with pre-existing loyalties, with independent and long-standing cultural traditions, and with a language different from that of the government, was viewed with suspicion and worse.' 86 Consequently, many of the ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers from Romania fell neatly into the traditional refugee definition: Those persecuted for their practices and beliefs.
In contrast, perhaps many of the asylum seekers who fled the former Yugoslavia left due to war. Although families fleeing artillery fire evoke sympathy in news stories, they often do not readily fall into the traditional refugee definition. This is because the harm that war refugees flee is generally viewed as danger due to their being unfortunate bystanders rather than danger due to their practices and beliefs. Accordingly, some might argue that asylum seekers fleeing Yugoslavia are fleeing generalized wartime conditions and thus are entitled to temporary protection rather than refugee status.
Again, as with the timing of the refugee arrivals, this can be a partial explanation at most. The war in former Yugoslavia has not been the 
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Mayellen Fullerton enduring this for years, they planned their departure for Hungary.
93
They left with the hope of starting a new life there.
94
In contrast, the non-ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers largely came from former Yugoslavia. They describe their lives before the war in positive terms. They left suddenly, when war or ethnic cleansing erupted near them.
9 5 They left with the hope that this was temporary madness. They expected to return home in a short time, and there are many stories of asylum seekers who arrived in mid-1991, having scheduled their summer vacation to cover their time in Hungary! 96 Furthermore, although there was no legal prohibition on seeking refugee status, most of the others streaming in from former Yugoslavia viewed themselves as people in need of temporary protection, and considered it appropriate to be placed in temporary protection status. 97 Thus, it would be natural for others fleeing to Hungary from the same conflagration to consider themselves, too, as candidates for temporary protection status rather than refugee status, especially since temporary protection comported with their original perspective on their situation.
In addition, the relative living standards in Hungary, Romania, and former Yugoslavia may have been another factor encouraging asylum seekers from one state to seek refugee status and those from another not to seek it. For many asylum seekers from Romania, the living standard in Hungary was a significant improvement.' 9 8 This would contribute to their desire to seek refugee status and start a new life in Hungary. For many asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, the living standard in Hungary was a step down.
1 99 This would make the asylum process and refugee status in Hungary less attractive, and the desire to return home stronger.
The difficulty is that the temporary crisis has not been a short-term one. Many who arrived thinking they could return to their homeland in a few months have now spent several years in Hungary.
2 " Second-class status and the inability to work legally are easy to ignore or tolerate for a few months. When the few months become years, these disadvantages begin to chafe. In particular, the lack of ability to work legally has ensured that temporarily protected persons remain wards of the state. Moreover, it has decreased families' abilities to function in a normal manner, depriving them of the opportunity to help themselves now and making it increasingly unlikely they will be able to be self-sufficient in the future.
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As the temporary stay became long-term, if not permanent, the importance of the legal rights that accompany refugee status became more obvious. This realization generally came too late, however. Refugee status was now out of reach of those in temporary protection status, no matter how dearly they may have been able to satisfy the refugee criteria in the beginning. By the time they acknowledged that their plight would not be short-term and that the legal conditions defining their stay in Hungary were important, they had long since missed the various 72-hour, 2 0 2 or even 3-month, 2 3 deadlines for filing applications for refugee status. Hungarian law has no provisions allowing asylum seekers to switch from temporary protection status to refugee status in mid-stream.
Although there may have been nothing malevolent in 1991 and 1992 about channelling asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia into temporary protection status rather than refugee status, this channelling continued long after the difficulties of doing so were identified. Throughout 1995, as new asylum seekers from Bosnia made their ways from forced labour camps and ethnically cleansed villages to the southern border of Hungary, they continued to be viewed as temporarily protected persons. 2 4 Like their predecessors in 1991 and 1992, these asylum seekers may have believed that they only needed short-term protection. Even so, on the basis of the experience of the preceding decade, Hungarian officials should have known that the refugee process was the appropriate path for many of the newcomers. Yet, notwithstanding the human rights reports and the earlier experience, the Bosnian asylum seekers continued to be considered as applicants for temporary protection status.
Other unsettling information concerning the disparate treatment of ethnic and non-etimic Hungarian refugees arose from a series of interviews with refugees. 0 5 Many ethnic Hungarians granted refugee status told stories of hard times and uncomfortable circumstances in their home countries. They recounted discrimination and their fears of the discrimination they and their children might face in the future. Whether this harsh treatment rose to the level of persecution was unclear, as is often the case. Nonetheless, it was striking that many ethnic Hungarians granted refugee status in the early 1990s recounted experiences that did not appear to constitute persecution. Their stories were more consonant with those of traditional immigrants, impelled to launch a new life in more promising surroundings, than they were with those of traditional refugees, forced to flee persecution. In contrast, many of the Bosnians granted temporary protection recounted chilling tales of being taken at gunpoint to forced labour camps. 0 6 Others spoke of being ordered to sell their homes and lands, and then commanded to pay the proceeds as they were forced to board buses that would remove them from their homeland. 0 7 Their stories, corroborated by international government officials working with refugees, 0 8 left little doubt that they had a well-founded fear of persecution based on their cultural background and religion.
Conclusion
Interviews with refugees, visits to refugee shelters, discussions with refugee workers, and meetings with government officials all lead to the conclusion that there is a two tier refugee system in Hungary. The top tier, by and large, is inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, the bottom tier by refugees of other ancestry. An examination of the refugee laws, in light of the historical and geographical context, also provides evidence that Hungary is particularly hospitable to asylum seekers from ethnic Hungarian communities. Traces of an unacknowledged preference for ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers can be detected in several legal provisions.
For example, knowing that many in Hungary feel a special kinship with ethnic Hungarians beyond the borders and may wish to support their decision to move to Hungary sheds light on the constitutional provision concerning asylum. An awareness of this sense of kinship explains facets of the new legislation regulating citizenship. Even Hungary's geographical reservation to the 1951 Convention assumes new meaning in light of the large ethnic Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries.
More persuasive evidence of a preference for ethnic Hungarians can be seen in the actual working of the refugee system. Neutral legal rules and principles are not applied neutrally. Those who gain access to the initial stages of the refugee procedure, those whose claims actually are adjudicated, those whose refugee claims are successful, those who benefit from the social programmes and the financial support programmes for refugees overwhelmingly are ethnic Hungarians.
The refugee law and system in Hungary provide substantial assistance to ethnic Hungarians who wish to emigrate to Hungary and less assistance than would be expected to non-Hungarians fleeing the threat of persecution. The discrimination in favour of ethnic Hungarians itself is not evil or morally reprehensible. Indeed, to many people it may seem natural. Nonetheless, this discrimination in the refugee system works on two levels and is troubling on both. First, it appears that ethnic Hungarians who are fleeing persecution are granted refugee status in much greater numbers than others who are fleeing persecution. Second, it appears that ethnic Hungarians who wish to leave lives of discrimination and hardship, but are not fleeing persecution, are often granted refugee status.
The first phenomenon is a problem of exclusion. Refugees who are not ethnic Hungarians stand less chance of being granted refugee status in Hungary than do their ethnic Hungarian counterparts. The second phenomenon is a problem of inclusion of non-refugees. Ethnic Hungarians who do not face a well-founded fear of persecution stand a greater chance of being granted refugee status in Hungary. This approach has perverted the refugee system into an immigration system. An immigration system is not evil. Furthermore, there is nothing illegal about encouraging and supporting immigration to Hungary by ethnic Hungarians. There is no inconsistency in welcoming both immigrants and refugees to Hungary. Ethnic Hungarian immigrants, however, should not be characterized as refugees and should not be supported by funds set aside for refugees. This misleads the public in Hungary and in the international community about the extent of Hungary's refugee burden and the assistance needed for refugees. Moreover, it sends a cynical message to Hungarian society that the legal system can and should be manipulated. It subverts the rule of law. In a country that is working to establish a return to the rule of law after four decades of communist party control, this misuse of the refugee law is a serious problem.
